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How	populism	emerged	from	the	shadow	of
neoliberalism	in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe
Hungary	and	Poland	have	pursued	a	notably	‘populist’	approach	to	the	economy	in	recent	years,	which	has	begun
to	spread	to	other	countries	in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe.	Mitchell	A.	Orenstein	and	Bojan	Bugarič	argue	that
Central	and	Eastern	European	states’	dependence	on	foreign	capital	initially	constrained	them	to	follow	neoliberal
economic	policies	following	their	democratic	transition.	After	the	global	financial	crisis,	populist	parties	began	to
break	from	this	consensus,	embracing	a	populist	agenda	which	includes	an	economic	programme	built	on	a
conservative	developmental	‘statism’.
Since	2008,	Hungary	and	Poland	have	developed	a	distinctive	populist	economic	programme,	which	has	begun	to
spread	to	other	Central	and	Eastern	European	countries.	What	is	it?	Where	did	it	originate?	And	what	kind	of
impact	is	it	having?	We	argue	that,	prior	to	2008,	the	Central	and	Eastern	European	countries’	dependence	on
foreign	capital	forced	even	populist	parties	to	endorse	(neo)liberal	economics.	But	after	the	global	financial	crisis,
populist	parties	began	to	break	from	the	liberal	consensus,	developing	an	economic	programme	based	on
conservative	statism.	Emphasising	economic	nationalism,	workforce	activation,	and	natalism,	these	policies	recall
the	Vichy	slogan	of,	“Work,	Family,	Fatherland.”	Central	and	Eastern	European	countries’	shift	towards	economic
populism	has	gone	hand-in-hand	with	attempts	to	attract	investments	from	Eastern	authoritarian	states,	illustrating	a
connection	we	find	between	their	development	strategies	and	sources	of	foreign	capital.
While	populism	arose	for	both	cultural	and	economic	reasons,	Central	and	Eastern	European	countries	have
embraced	neoliberal	economic	policies	more	than	any	other	developing	world	region,	even	though	their	populations
continue	to	believe	that	the	state	should	play	a	strong	state	role	in	welfare	provision.	More	neoliberalism	created	a
greater	possibility	of	populist	backlash.	Yet,	this	economic	reaction	was	delayed.	While	Central	and	Eastern
European	governments	launched	highly	disruptive	neoliberal	reform	programmes	in	the	early	1990s,	the	expected
rejection	or	reversal	of	these	policies	–	due	to	a	turn	to	the	left	or	a	populist	wave	–	did	not	happen.	Until	2008,	no
major	Central	and	Eastern	European	government	rejected	the	economic	policies	of	liberalism	promoted	by	Western
international	organisations.
Scholars	have	theorised	that	Central	and	Eastern	European	governments	continued	to	advance	liberal	economic
policies	due	to	a	desperate	need	for	foreign	capital.	In	order	to	attract	foreign	investment,	they	competed	with	one
another	to	adopt	neoliberal	economic	reforms.	International	financial	institutions	such	as	the	European	Bank	for
Reconstruction	and	Development	(EBRD)	created	ranking	systems	that	showed	exactly	what	type	of	reforms	to
introduce.	Central	and	Eastern	European	countries	competed	with	one	another	to	rise	to	the	top	of	these	ranking
systems,	or	at	least	to	not	fall	too	far	behind.	They	competed	not	only	among	themselves,	but	against	other
developing	countries.	In	this	global	competition,	they	started	out	behind.	China	began	liberalising	its	economy	in	the
late	1970s.	Most	other	developing	countries	began	in	the	early	1980s.	Central	and	Eastern	European	countries
rushed	to	catch	up.
Populist	parties	go	along
In	this	context,	it	is	perhaps	not	surprising	that	populist	right-wing	parties,	like	most	other	parties,	went	along	with
the	adoption	of	neoliberal	reforms	and	soft-pedalled	efforts	to	backtrack.	David	Ost	points	out	that	Poland’s	Law
and	Justice	Party,	during	its	first	term	in	office	from	2005-07,	“maintained	and	even	advanced	neoliberal	economic
orthodoxy,	such	as	eliminating	the	inheritance	tax	and	cutting	payroll	taxes,	creating	a	deficit	in	the	social	security
account	that	led	to	pressure	to	raise	the	retirement	age”	(p.	114)
Viktor	Orbán’s	pre-2008	governments	in	Hungary	did	not	depart	from	neoliberal	policy	prescriptions	either.	Seán
Hanley	and	Allan	Sikk	show	that	prior	to	2008,	populist	parties	in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe	mostly	combined
“mainstream	ideology	on	economic	and	socio-cultural	issues	with	fierce	anti-establishment	rhetoric	and	demands
for	political	reform,	transparency	and	new	ways	of	‘doing	politics’”	(p.	522).	They	did	not	challenge	the	prevailing
neoliberal	economic	policies	pushed	by	the	international	financial	institutions,	since	doing	so	could	impede	inflows
of	foreign	capital.	Some	scholars	believe	this	trend	continues.
LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog: How populism emerged from the shadow of neoliberalism in Central and Eastern Europe Page 1 of 3
	
	
Date originally posted: 2020-10-21
Permalink: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2020/10/21/how-populism-emerged-from-the-shadow-of-neoliberalism-in-central-and-eastern-europe/
Blog homepage: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/
Hungarian	Parliament,	Credit:	Hans	Permana	(CC	BY-NC	2.0)
The	result	for	voters	in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe	was	that,	despite	discontent	with	rising	inequality,	low
employment,	high	population	outflows,	and	other	ills,	they	could	not	shake	these	policies	at	the	polls,	no	matter	how
they	voted.	Central	and	Eastern	European	voters	rarely	voted	for	incumbent	parties.	They	often	sought	populist
alternatives	at	the	polls,	but	these	alternative	parties	generally	continued	the	same	neoliberal	policies,	lost
popularity,	and	were	voted	out	in	due	course.	Party	systems	remained	volatile,	but	the	policy	regime	remained	more
or	less	the	same,	thanks	to	governments’	awareness	that	they	must	subordinate	their	economic	policy	preferences
to	the	larger	goals	of	joining	the	European	Union	and	North	Atlantic	Treaty	Organization	(NATO)	and	attracting
investment,	considered	essential	for	security	and	economic	development.	As	Cas	Mudde	puts	it,	the	populist	surge
became	a	natural	“illiberal	democratic	response	to	decades	of	undemocratic	liberal	policies”	(p.	30).
Post-crisis	transformation
The	global	financial	crisis	changed	this	dynamic.	Suddenly	in	2008	and	2009,	when	the	crisis	hit	Central	and
Eastern	Europe,	confidence	in	neoliberal	reforms	as	a	method	of	attracting	foreign	direct	investment	and	growth
sharply	declined.	The	global	financial	crisis	originated	in	the	Western	economies.	Central	and	Eastern	European
countries	found	themselves	highly	exposed	because	through	privatisation,	they	had	sold	a	majority	of	their	banks	to
foreign,	mostly	West	European,	conglomerates.	During	the	2000s,	this	enabled	hundreds	of	billions	of	dollars	to
flow	into	Central	and	Eastern	Europe,	a	transformational	wave	of	foreign	investment	that	seemed	to	represent	the
reward	for	adopting	painful	neoliberal	policies.	Then,	just	as	suddenly,	it	stopped,	leading	to	deep	recessions.
Impressive	economic	growth	of	nearly	six	percent	per	annum	between	2000-2006	was	replaced	by	decline
throughout	the	region.
A	new	growth	model
Not	surprisingly,	some	Central	and	Eastern	European	governments	began	to	consider	alternative	economic	growth
models.	Populist	parties	jumped	to	the	front	of	the	line	to	reject	the	economic	policies	of	neoliberalism.	The
mainstream	centre-left	had	discredited	itself	with	traditional	left	voters	by	supporting	neoliberal	reforms.	During
transition,	former	communist	parties	sought	to	prove	their	capitalist	bona	fides	by	outpacing	the	right	in	advocating
for	neoliberal	market	reforms.	Left	parties	pushed	for	European	Union	membership,	which	also	required	neoliberal
reforms,	hoping	to	restrain	conservative	nationalism	over	the	long	term.	This	left	the	field	of	welfare	nationalism	–
support	for	welfare	programmes	benefiting	deserving	domestic	populations	and	often	serving	nationalist	goals	–
open	to	the	far	right.
LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog: How populism emerged from the shadow of neoliberalism in Central and Eastern Europe Page 2 of 3
	
	
Date originally posted: 2020-10-21
Permalink: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2020/10/21/how-populism-emerged-from-the-shadow-of-neoliberalism-in-central-and-eastern-europe/
Blog homepage: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/
Populists	began	to	develop	a	compelling	response	to	the	grievances	of	citizens	disappointed	with	neoliberalism:	a
nationalist,	authoritarian	populism,	combined	with	a	welfare	chauvinist	social	policy,	promising	to	protect	ordinary
people	from	liberal	elites	and	grow	the	economy	based	on	economic	self-rule	and	a	conservative	developmental
state.	On	the	one	hand,	populists	emphasised	measures	such	as	returning	ownership	of	banks	to	domestic	hands,
imposing	special	taxes	on	foreign	retail,	and	consolidating	national	champions	in	certain	sectors	of	the	economy.
They	sought	to	create	more	jobs,	activating	a	workforce	that	had	lost	millions	of	jobs	since	1989	and	stemming	out-
migration,	while	promoting	a	conservative	vision	of	family	life	through	pro-natalist	policies,	intended	to	fight
immigration,	increase	the	domestic	workforce,	and	create	reasons	for	people	to	stay.	A	substantial	split	from	the
policies	of	neoliberalism,	this	(neo)conservative	economics	brought	economic	dividends	to	Hungary	and	Poland,
the	countries	that	pioneered	it,	and	is	now	spreading	to	many	other	Central	and	Eastern	European	countries,	as
well	as	to	countries	like	Britain.
For	more	information,	see	the	authors’	accompanying	paper	in	the	Journal	of	European	Public	Policy
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	authors,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.	Featured	image	credit:	Hans	Permana	(CC	BY-NC	2.0)
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